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Abstract
Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may ne-
gotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desir-
ability of bundling when values are common or/and information endogenous. The
paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby
facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security
design.
The paper’s second contribution is an analysis of the velocity of assets that are
repeatedly traded. The dynamic model can be nested into the static one. The cen-
tral insight is that liquidity is self-fulfilling: A perception of future illiquidity creates
current illiquidity.
Keywords: Liquidity, velocity, security design, tranching, information acquisition.
JEL numbers: D82, E51, G12, G14.
1 Introduction
This paper studies “liquidity” (here defined as the volume of rational trade) in environ-
ments in which buyers and sellers may exchange goods either piecemeal or bundled. The
private and social desirability of bundling, or conversely tranching, hinges on whether it
facilitates or hinders trade, and has two facets: a) does bundling facilitate trade for given
information structures? And b) does bundling incentivize information structures that are
conducive to trade? While we shed light on a), our first main contribution concerns b): we
show that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating
trade, hence the title of the paper.
∗Corresponding author: Jean Tirole, +33561128642, jean.tirole@tse-fr.eu. The authors thank participants
in seminars in Lausanne and Mannheim and at the Jacob Marschak lecture (Lacea-Lames in Santiago de
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Contracts” for financial support for this research. They are very grateful to Olivier Wang for excellent
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Section 2 develops the following canonical model. A good or asset has value sδ+ S
to the seller and bδ+ B to the buyer, where δ = 1 (high-quality) or 0 (lemon) and S ≤ B
and s ≤ b (gains from trade). The seller and the buyer can privately learn δ at a cost (that
may differ between the two parties). They then bargain. Equilibrium liquidity depends
on information acquisition costs and on the parties’ bargaining powers. An asymme-
try of information about the quality of the good/asset creates a suboptimal volume of
trade. Bundling implies that the bundle is sold wholesale, while tranching/piecemeal
negotiations consist in negotiating separately over the safe (δ-insensitive) and the risky
(δ-sensitive) parts.
“Common value” environments with bundling/tranching decisions abound:
• Structured finance : our lead example concerns the choice of whether to pool or
tranche securities, say in safe debt and risky equity components.
• Industrial organization : common values arise when a higher quality is associated
with a higher cost for the manufacturer or when parties enjoy resale options. Risk
shifting through warranties, return options or additional coverage in insurance con-
tracts may be tied to, or obtained separately from the acquisition of the basic prod-
uct.
• Compensation design : An employer and an employee may negotiate over a fixed
wage and a performance-based bonus, or directly over both. Common values arise
from the employer’ ability to know more about the profitability of the task and the
employee’s knowledge of his talent or capability in the task.
• Politics : Legislators have found that combining separate measures into one large
bill, called an omnibus bill, often enhances the odds for passage but can also lead to
a complete breakdown of legislative action.
• International negotiations : Opinions diverge as to whether climate change negoti-
ations should be conducted at the sectoral level or globally. Piecemeal negotiations
(the equivalent of tranching) affect incentives for information acquisition as well as
incentives for lobbies to build up resistance to an agreement.
• Banking regulation : Separation between investment and retail banking (Glass-Steagall
Act, Volker and Vickers rules)1 is akin to the tranching of a universal bank into a
relatively low-information-intensity entity (the retail bank) and a high-information-
intensity entity (the investment bank). Buyers of claims on the bank (retail deposi-
tors – i.e. the banking regulator/taxpayers –, wholesale depositors, etc.) face differ-
ent incentives to collect information in the two arrangements, an issue that has been
overlooked in the policy discussions on the matter.
• Project financing : Public authorities may negotiate the construction and manage-
ment & maintenance contracts separately (and usually sequentially); or the two may
be bundled as in public-private partnerships.
1We are grateful to Elu van Thadden for this suggestion.
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Section 3 shows how tranching impacts both liquidity for a given information struc-
ture, and information acquisition. Taking the information structure as given (like much
of the literature), it unveils two conflicting effects of tranching. On the one hand, tranch-
ing protects the safe component from the risk of illiquidity. This insulation effect has
attracted much attention in the literature (since Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)). On the
other hand, the absence of bundled safe component in the risky component reduces the
cost of not trading the risky part and thereby makes the trading of the risky part less
likely: the bundling of the safe part is a trading adjuvant for the transfer of the risky part.
The global impact of these insulation and trading adjuvant effects depends on the liquid-
ity of the bundle: if the bundle is liquid, then tranching can only hinder the transfer of
value between parties. By contrast, if the bundle is illiquid, tranching increases liquidity
by ensuring that the debt component is transferred.
Endogenizing the information structure, Section 4.1 then argues that spinning off the
safe component increases the incentive to acquire information when information is to be
deterred (because one party finds it too expensive to acquire information) and reduces
this incentive when information acquisition is to be encouraged (so to re-establish the
symmetry of information). It thereby identifies an important cost of tranching.
The thrust of the argument goes as follows: Consider a situation in which both par-
ties remain ignorant and so gains from trade are fully realized. One party’s temptation
to become informed is associated with the option not to trade. The seller would like to
identify a gem so as to keep it and sell only if the good/asset has mediocre quality; like-
wise, the buyer aspires at identifying a lemon so as to refrain from acquiring it. Deterring
information acquisition thus requires making the absence of trade costly. Spinning off the
safe component reduces the cost of not trading the risky (information intensive) part; it
thereby encourages information acquisition and may reduce the overall liquidity.2
By contrast, when one party is informed, the incentive of the other party to become
informed is associated with an increase in the probability of trading as symmetric in-
formation delivers efficient trade. And bundling increases the cost of not trading. The
literature has mostly considered situations in which at most one party to the potential
trade is informed. When both sides can acquire information, ignorance may no longer be
desirable. Indeed, liquidity stems not from the lack of information, but more generally
from the commonality of information. And so if one party is likely to be informed, it is
desirable to encourage information acquisition by the other party so as to reestablish the
symmetry of information and thereby restore liquidity.
To highlight the adverse social impact of tranching on information acquisition, we
then restrict attention to parameter values such that the insulation effect dominates the
trading adjuvant effect, and so tranching is a superior alternative when parties are exoge-
2This mechanism is reminiscent of Whinston (1990)’s argument that bundling a monopoly good with
a competitive one makes it more costly for a seller not to sell the competitive one and so increases his
volume of sales in the competitive market. Whinston’s application and focus - entry deterrence – are rather
unrelated with the current paper, though.
Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) point out that pooling different assets, each
with its own underlying information, reduces asymmetries of information (by the law of large numbers)
and therefore boosts liquidity. Their insight is unrelated to the one just developed, as we consider a single
asset, which can be tranched or sold as is.
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nously asymmetrically informed (tranching is obviously liquidity-neutral under symmet-
ric information). Even in this most favorable case for tranching, tranching may become
undesirable once information acquisition is endogenized.
To drive home the point that tranching works again the commonality of information,
we also use a simple convexity argument to show that if commonality of information
prevails when a security is tranched into n arbitrary securities, then it prevails a fortiori
when the security is not tranched.
While the first part of the paper is concerned with a one-shot trade, the paper’s sec-
ond contribution is to embody these considerations in a dynamic framework in which an
asset changes hands repeatedly (the financial interpretation of the model is most natural
here, and we will therefore employ its terminology). The counterpart of asset liquidity
is then asset velocity. Section 4 constructs a dynamic-trading model in which the asset’s
unknown dividends are i.i.d. and parties can learn the realization of the dividend one
period ahead; there is no bundling/tranching here (the asset is fixed), but this dynamic
framework can be nested in the canonical model of Sections 2 and 3, making it possible
to apply their results. The endogenous resale values are part of the asset’s return stream
and the information sensitive component concerns next period’s dividend.
The central insight is that liquidity is self-fulfilling: A perception of future illiquidity
creates current illiquidity. The intuition for this result is closely related to the insights
obtained for the analysis of tranching. A high liquidity in the future makes the asset a
desirable store of value. The high price thus fetched in the future technically resembles
an increase in the value of the safe component and is therefore a trading adjuvant in
current negotiations. The expectation of future liquidity makes it more costly not to trade
today and thereby boosts current liquidity.
Section 5 concludes with some alleys for future research.
Related literature. Most of the existing literature is couched in the context of structured
finance. Financial institutions and corporations need to store value to meet cash shortages
and take advantage of acquisition and investment opportunities. The attractiveness of an
asset as a store of value hinges on its liquidity – its owner’s ability to rapidly part with the
asset at a fair price. Liquidity in turn requires buyers not to cherry pick high-quality assets
and sellers not to trade only their lemons. As the recent crisis and other episodes suggest,
suspicions about asset quality may have serious consequences for the functioning of the
economy.
Starting with Akerlof (1970), economists have investigated the impact of information
held by either sellers or buyers on the volume of trade and efficiency. It has been estab-
lished that informed sellers have an incentive to engage in limited securitization/resale
in order to signal asset quality (Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984)) and
that security design prior to seller information acquisition may reduce signaling costs
(DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), DeMarzo (2005), Plantin (2009)). Sellers’ ability to part
with their assets at fair prices is also hindered when buyers have private information,
the focus of much market micro-structure economics; in this spirit, Gorton and Pennac-
chi (1990) recommend the use of tranching to create low-information-intensity (debt-like)
securities that protect sellers from the “seller’s curse”, namely the risk of selling only
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high-quality assets when trading with an informed buyer.3 Thus, low-information in-
tensity (LII)/debt-like securities mitigate adverse selection (held by an informed seller in
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and an informed buyer in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).4
An important recent strand of this literature, initiated by Dang et al (2011), notes that
information structures are endogenous and so argues that securities, to be liquid, should
be designed with an eye on their impact on information acquisition.5 Dang et al. show
that debt contracts optimally deter buyer information acquisition and may thereby maxi-
mize seller welfare. Two central and recurring insights of the literature are:
• Tranching is optimal. The creation of debt-like securities alleviates buyer concerns
about the seller’s ability to foist a lemon, and seller concerns about the seller’s curse.
It further minimizes incentives for information acquisition. Tranching thus boosts
liquidity, the value of assets and welfare.
• Ignorance is bliss. The acquisition of information by the potentially informed party
is to be deterred or at least limited.
This static part of our paper revisits and qualifies these conclusions in several ways
that will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3. Besides the fact that we allow two-
sided information acquisition, thereby generalizing the second insight to “Commonality
of information is bliss”, we also assume that the seller cannot commit not to sell the risky
component after having sold the safe one, thereby limiting the seller’s ability to reduce
incentives for information acquisition by limiting the volume of issuance. We are ag-
nostic as to which of the two polar cases, that of the security design literature and our
no-commitment assumption, is more realistic. For example, under limited seller liquid-
ity needs, for which selling the safe component suffices, the commitment assumption is
rather reasonable; by contrast for higher liquidity needs, it will be hard for the seller to
commit not to bring the risky part to the market as well.
A recent literature emphasizes the role of informational asymmetries in an economy
with a shortage of liquid assets. Lester et al (2012) considers a highly tractable environ-
ment embodying extreme adverse selection in an economy with search frictions: Agents
are either fully knowledgeable about the asset that can be used to trade goods; or they
cannot even recognize a counterfeit (and their counterparty knows that). Then trade
can only occur between cognoscenti. “Money” then refers to assets which many agents
in the economy are familiar with. A key contribution of Lester et al (2012), which em-
phasizes themes rather different from ours, is to embody the lemons idea into a general
equilibrium in which monetary assets are scarce and compete with each other. When in-
formation is endogenized, multiple equilibria may co-exist. Gorton and Ordonez (2012)
3See also Hennessy (2012), who further endogenizes the speculator’s information acquisition.
4Biais and Mariotti (2005) shows that debt protects not only against adverse selection, but also against
monopsony power. In their paper, the issuer receives a signal for the underlying asset’s final payoff realiza-
tion after the security design stage, but before trading takes place. The buyer offers a schedule specifying
a transfer T(q) for arbitrary fractions q in [0, 1] of the security. For example, when the signal is the future
payoff realization, a debt claim has the same value for all realizations beyond the nominal debt claim; this
creates an elastic demand curve and limits the buyer’s market power.
5See Yang (2011) for a neat extension of the Dang et al framework, and Crémer and Khalil (1992) for an
early paper on optimal mechanism design with endogenous information acquisition by the agent.
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develops a dynamic version of Dang et al (2011) in which the quality of a collateralized
asset moves over time and mean-reverts. Borrowers scale down the use of collateral in
bad macroeconomic times in order to prevent information acquisition, leading to an out-
put decline. Like Lester et al, the focus is on macroeconomic behavior rather than on the
micro-economic themes emphasized in our paper.
Our paper is also related to the literature on bargaining under endogenously asym-
metric information. Like Dang et al (2011) and Yang (2011), this literature is preoccupied
mainly with information acquisition deterrence, albeit in simpler games of bargaining
with take-it-or-leave-it offers for the bundle (there is no security design). Shavell (1994)
studies the voluntary and mandatory disclosure of hard, private-value information in a
trading relationship between a seller and a buyer; he shows for instance that the seller has
excessive incentives to acquire information about the buyer’s valuation whether this in-
formation is socially useful or not, and that disclosure should be mandated. Dang (2008),
in a common-value environment, points out that no trade and no information acquisition
may simultaneously arise in equilibrium, and also shows that, in contrast with conven-
tional wisdom, a party receiving the offer may obtain up to the full social surplus of the
transaction when the offer is tailored to discourage him from acquiring information. Be-
sides some modeling differences (in particular, we assume that parties decide whether to
acquire their information before bargaining, so offers cannot by themselves deter infor-
mation acquisition), these papers again have a different focus and do not address the two
main themes of our paper, tranching and repeated trading.
The literature on security design has focused on a single trade and therefore not in-
vestigated the velocity and self-fulfilling liquidity issues studied in the repeated trading
part of the paper. Self-fulfilling thin markets have been a recurrent theme of the market
micro-structure literature since at least Pagano (1989) and Dow (2004): see, e.g., Cespa
(2002) and Spiegel (1998); several of these papers have investigated dynamic properties
of pricing in situations of adverse selection. For example, Duffie et al (2012) describe a
market with exogenous or endogenous acquisition of information about the final (date-T)
payoff of the asset. Agents have different valuations for the asset (so the asset may not be
in the right hands) and bargain as in a double auction when they meet. Because agents
meet at most once and the double auction equilibrium is revealing, the information of the
owner after the meeting is the sum of the two informations. They study the percolation of
information over time and also show that information acquisition may be lower in more
active markets.
Particularly closely related to Section 4, Moore (2010) develops a dynamic trading
model in which the date-t buyer becomes a seller at date t + 1. Assuming learning by
holding (the owner of the asset automatically learns the payoff of the asset, which ac-
crues at the final date T + 1), full bargaining power for the seller, and the impossibility
to repurchase the asset once sold, Moore shows that “tail wags dog”, i.e. that if the mar-
ket fails at T then it fails at all earlier dates; he also shows that multiple equilibria may
co-exist in an infinite horizon version of the model, in which the dividend is perfectly
correlated (as opposed to i.i.d. as in our model). Moore’s focus is rather different from
ours, as he applies these ideas to banking and fire sales (showing that financial distress
may not alleviate adverse selection, in contrast with the standard implication of the Ak-
erlof model); our analysis focuses more narrowly on the dynamic liquidity issue, allows
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Information
acquisition stage
Buyer and seller
(secretly) decide
whether to become
informed
Bargaining stage
With probability αi,
party i sets price
Party j
accepts/rejects
Figure 1: Timing.
for endogenous information acquisition, and does not rely on the impossibility of re-
purchases. Rostek and Weretka (2011) also find that the perception of future illiquidity
creates current illiquidity; their mechanism is complementary to ours, as their paper does
not study the effects of information structures and information acquisition, and instead
focuses on the relaxation of the price taking hypothesis.
Finally, there is a large, industrial organization literature on the impact of bundling in a
context of asymmetric, exogenous information (the buyer knows his preferences) and the
seller has full bargaining power: see e.g. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) and Armstrong
(2013) for recent contributions and the references therein. In contrast with our paper,
that literature assumes private values as well as exogenous, one-sided information; in a
nutshell, the buyer knows his preferences and the seller price discriminates. This simpler
framework allows the literature to consider much more general demand functions than
that studied here.
2 Static Model
Consider a meeting between a seller and a buyer. The seller is endowed with an asset
(we will use the terminology of our lead example). He can sell this asset to the buyer. The
surplus from owning the asset for the seller and the buyer are given by respectively sδ+ S
and bδ+ B, where δ = 1 with probability ρ and δ = 0 with probability 1− ρ. Both the
buyer and the seller are risk neutral. We make the following assumption, which ensures
that there are gains from trade.
Assumption 1. (Gains from Trade). b ≥ s and B ≥ S.
We assume that δ is initially unknown to both the buyer and the seller. The seller and
the buyer can learn δ at a cost cS and cB respectively. One party cannot observe whether
the other party is informed or not.
Bargaining takes place as follows. With probability αS, the seller makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, and with the complementary probability αB = 1− αS, the buyer makes a
take-it-or-leave-it-offer. Hence we can take αS (αB) to represent the bargaining power of
the seller (buyer).
The timing is described in Figure 1. First, parties decide whether or not to become
informed. Then nature determines who gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Finally the
offer is made and is either accepted or rejected, and payoffs are realized.
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Equilibrium concept. Our equilibrium concept is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE). We will often be confronted with a situation of bargaining under asymmetric
information—both on the equilibrium path, and also off the equilibrium path when we
consider the incentives of parties to acquire information. When an uninformed party
makes an offer to an informed party, the uninformed party just sets its monopoly price,
and the informed party either accepts or rejects the offer. Things are more complex when
an informed party makes an offer to an uninformed party. The reason is that the offer
potentially conveys information and acts as a signaling mechanism. This typically leads
to multiple PBEs. We will always select the trade maximizing equilibrium. Imagine for
example that the informed party is the seller, and the uninformed party the buyer. Then
in the trade maximizing equilibrium, the seller sets a price and sells the asset only if δ
is below a cutoff (0 or 1). The price is such that the buyer is indifferent between buying
and not buying the asset, knowing that the asset is offered to him only if δ is below the
cutoff. We can always construct beliefs such that this outcome is a PBE. It is the PBE that
maximizes both the probability of trade and the welfare of the party making the offer.
In the paper, we will use the following wording convention. With a slight abuse,
we will say that no offer is made when an offer is made but this offer is rejected with
probability 1. This convention obviously has no material impact on our analysis.
Inefficient trade with asymmetric information. Unless otherwise stated, we make
two additional assumptions:
Assumption 2. (Inefficient Trade when Only S is Informed). s + S > bρ+ B.
Assumption 3. (Inefficient Trade when Only B is Informed). sρ+ S > B.
The left-hand side of Assumption 2 represents an informed seller’s reservation value
when δ = 1. The right-hand side represents the most that an uninformed buyer is willing
to pay. Similarly, the left-hand side of Assumption 3 represents the reservation value of
an uninformed seller. The right-hand side represents an informed buyer’s willingness to
pay when δ = 0.
To understand the role of these assumptions, it is necessary to anticipate the nature of
the several types of equilibria that can arise in our model. There are equilibria with asym-
metric information where only one party is informed. When only the seller is informed,
we refer to the equilibrium as an (Only S) equilibrium. Similarly, when only the buyer
is informed, we call the equilibrium (Only B). There are also equilibria with symmetric
information. When both parties are informed, we call the equilibrium (I). When no party
is informed, we call the equilibrium (NI).
Together with Assumption 1, Assumptions 2 and 3 are sufficient for the equilibria with
asymmetric information (Only S) and (Only B) to feature less than full trade—this is to
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be compared with equilibria with no or full information, where trade always occurs.6,7
2.1 Four types of equilibrium information structures
We derive conditions on the costs of acquiring information
(
cS, cB
)
for potential pure-
strategy equilibria to exist. For each candidate equilibrium, we describe the equilibrium
strategies. The reader can look at one equilibrium (e.g., (NI)) derivation and move directly
to Figure 2, which summarizes the four possibilities.
2.1.1 Non-Informed equilibrium (NI)
Equilibrium. We first characterize equilibria where neither the seller nor the buyer are
informed. If the seller makes the offer, he sets a price equal to bρ+ B. If the buyer makes
the offer, he sets a price equal to sρ+ S. Trade always occurs. The party making the offer
appropriates all the trade surplus (bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S). The payoffs to the seller and the
buyer are
vS = αS [bρ+ B] + αB [sρ+ S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αB [(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)] .
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire infor-
mation. Suppose that the seller becomes informed. If the seller makes the offer, then he
does not sell the asset if δ = 1, and sells the asset at price bρ+ B if δ = 0. The fact that
the seller prefers not to sell at price bρ+ B if δ = 1 is a direct consequence of Assumption
2.8 Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. The seller accepts the offer and sells the
6Introduce the following two weaker versions of Assumptions 2 and 3 (we sometimes refer to them as
such).
Assumption 4. (Weak Version of Assumption 2). bρ+ B− (s + S) < (1− ρ)(B− S).
Assumption 5. (Weak Version of Assumption 3). B < ρ(b + B) + (1− ρ)S.
Then a necessary and sufficient condition for (Only S) to feature less than full trade if the seller makes
the offer is Assumption 2; a necessary and sufficient condition for (Only S) to feature less than full trade if
the buyer makes the offer is Assumption 4. Similarly, a necessary and sufficient condition for (Only B) to
feature less than full trade if the seller makes the offer is Assumption 5; a necessary and sufficient condition
for (Only B) to feature less than full trade if the buyer makes the offer is Assumption 3.
7They are also necessary and sufficient so that in (NI), a party who secretly becomes informed will trade
less. They imply that in (I), a party who secretly becomes uninformed sets a monopoly price that features
less than full trade. Similarly, they imply that in an equilibrium where only one party is informed (Only
S or Only B), if the uninformed party makes the offer, it sets a monopoly price that features less than full
trade. Finally, the conditions are also necessary and sufficient so that in an equilibrium where only one
party is informed (Only S or Only B), if the informed party decides to secretly become uninformed, then
there is no trade.
8To check that this outcome maximizes trade given the information structure, suppose that the seller
makes an offer different from bρ + B, generating off-the-equilibrium path beliefs ρˆ > ρ (if ρˆ ≤ ρ, the
seller doesn’t benefit from offering an unexpected price). The seller trades the high-quality asset only if
bρˆ+ B ≥ s + S, but then the value to the buyer is only bρ+ B, leading to a rejection.
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asset if δ = 0 and keeps the asset if δ = 1. As a result, the condition that the seller does
not acquire information is
cS ≥ αBρ [(s + S)− (sρ+ S)] + αSρ [(s + S)− (bρ+ B)] .
Similarly, using Assumption 3 the condition that the buyer does not acquire information
is
cB ≥ αB (1− ρ) [sρ+ S− B] + αS (1− ρ) [bρ+ B− B] .
Define
cS ≡ αBρ (1− ρ) s + αSρ [(s + S)− (bρ+ B)] ,
cB ≡ αB (1− ρ) [sρ+ S− B] + αSρ (1− ρ) b.
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (NI). The Non-Informed (NI) equilibrium exists if and only if cS ≥ cS and cB ≥
cB.
The incentives to become informed in the (NI) equilibrium derive solely from the pos-
sibility of refusing disadvantageous trades, whether or not the party who becomes in-
formed makes the offer. Importantly, the incentives to become informed do not arise
from an ability to charge different prices when trade does occur. For example, if the seller
becomes informed, he chooses not to sell when δ = 1 whether or not he makes the offer.
2.1.2 Informed equilibrium (I)
Equilibrium. Here we characterize the equilibrium where both the seller and the buyer
are informed. If the seller makes the offer, he sets a price equal to bδ + B. If the buyer
makes the offer, he sets a price equal to sδ+ S. Trade always occurs. The payoffs to the
seller and the buyer are the same as in (NI) minus the information acquisition costs:
vS = αS [bρ+ B] + αB [sρ+ S]− cS,
vB = αS [0] + αB [(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)]− cB.
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire in-
formation. Suppose that the seller decides not to become informed. Suppose first that
the seller makes the offer. Provided that ρ (b + B) + (1− ρ) S ≥ B, which is implied by
Assumption 3, the seller sets a price equal to b+ B (rather than B), so that the buyer buys
the asset if δ = 1 and not if δ = 0. Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. Then
the buyer’s offer reveals δ, and the seller always accepts the buyer’s offer. Hence the
condition that the seller becomes informed can be written as
cS ≤ αS [(bρ+ B)− ρ (b + B)− (1− ρ) S] .
Similarly, provided that (1− ρ) [B− S] ≥ bρ+ B− (s + S), which is implied by Assump-
tion 2, the condition that the buyer becomes informed can be written as
cB ≤ αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] .
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Define
c¯S ≡ αS (1− ρ) [B− S] ,
c¯B ≡ αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] .
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (I). The Informed (I) equilibrium exists if and only if cS ≤ c¯S and cB ≤ c¯B.
The incentives to become informed for a party in the (I) equilibrium come from the
possibility to perfectly price discriminate the other party when making the offer. If instead
the party under consideration does not become informed, he has to revert in this case to
imperfect price discrimination. He thus extracts less surplus and trades less if it does not
become informed.
2.1.3 Only S Informed equilibrium (Only S)
Equilibrium. Here we characterize the equilibrium where the seller is informed but the
buyer is not. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to B and sells the asset
only if δ = 0. The buyer accepts the seller’s offer if it is made. The other candidate price,
bρ + B, can be ruled out using Assumption 2 which guarantees that if δ = 1, the seller
does not want to sell at this price. If the buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal
to S, and the seller accepts the offer only if δ = 0. Provided that (bρ+ B) − (s + S) ≤
(1− ρ) [B− S], which is implied by Assumption 2, the other candidate price, s + S, is an
inferior strategy for the buyer. The payoffs to the seller and the buyer are
vS = αS [ρ (s + S) + (1− ρ) B] + αB [sρ+ S]− cS,
vB = αS [0] + αB (1− ρ) [B− S] .
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire infor-
mation. We analyze the incentives of the seller and of the buyer in turn. Suppose that the
seller decides not to become informed. If the seller makes the offer, then the seller does
not want to sell—a strategy preferred to that of selling under Assumption 3. Suppose
now that the buyer makes the offer. Then the seller does not sell. Hence the condition
that the seller becomes informed can be written as
cS ≤ αS [ρ (s + S) + (1− ρ) B− (sρ+ S)] .
We now analyze the incentives of the buyer. Suppose that the buyer decides to become
informed. If the seller makes the offer, then the buyer still accepts the offer of the seller if
it is made, i.e. if δ = 0. Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. Then he sets a price
equal to sδ+ S, and the seller always accepts the offer. Hence the condition that the buyer
does not become informed can be written as
cB ≥ αB [ρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] + (1− ρ) [B− S]− (1− ρ) [B− S]] .
We then have the following proposition.
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Proposition 3. (Only S). The (Only S) equilibrium exists if and only if cS ≤ c¯S and cB ≥ c¯B.
The incentives for the seller to become informed in the (Only S) equilibrium are that if
the seller makes the offer, he can sell at a low price if δ = 0 and extract all the surplus of the
buyer. By contrast, if the seller does not become informed, he finds it best not to sell at all,
extracting less surplus and trading less. The incentives for the buyer to become informed
in the (Only S) equilibrium come from the possibility to perfectly price discriminate the
seller when the buyer makes the offer. If instead the buyer does not become informed, he
has to revert in this case to imperfect price discrimination by charging a monopoly price.
The buyer thus extracts less surplus if it does not become informed, and also trades less.
2.1.4 Only B informed equilibrium (Only B)
Equilibrium. Here we characterize the equilibrium where the buyer is informed but the
seller is not. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to b+ B, and the buyer
accepts the offer only if δ = 1. Provided that B ≤ ρ (b + B) + (1− ρ) S, which is implied
by Assumption 3, the other candidate price, B, is an inferior strategy for the seller. If the
buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to s + S and buys the asset only if δ = 1.
The seller accepts the offer of the buyer if it is made. The other candidate price, sρ+ S,
can be ruled out using Assumption 3, which guarantees that if δ = 0, the buyer does not
want to buy at this price. The payoffs to the seller and the buyer are
vS = αS [ρ (b + B) + (1− ρ) S] + αB [sρ+ S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)]− cB.
Incentives to acquire information. Let us now turn to the incentives to acquire infor-
mation. The analysis is similar to that of the (Only S) case.
Proposition 4. (Only B). The (Only B) equilibrium exists if and only if cS ≥ c¯S and cB ≤ c¯B.
The incentives to become informed in the (Only B) equilibrium are the mirror image
of the corresponding incentives in the (Only S) equilibrium. We do not discuss them in
detail for brevity.
2.2 Equilibrium regions with endogenous information acquisition
It is useful to note that the incentives to acquire information are the same for both parties
in (I), (Only S) and (Only B). That is, the increase in expected payoff from becoming
informed for a party who is uninformed in equilibrium, or the loss in expected payoff
from becoming uninformed for a party who is informed in equilibrium, are the same in
equilibria (I), (Only S) and (Only B).
We depict equilibrium regions in the
(
cS, cB
)
space. The configuration of the equilib-
rium regions is different depending on whether cB (cS) is lower or greater than c¯B (c¯S),
i.e. depending on wether the incentives to become informed in (NI) are lower than in (I),
(Only S) and (Only B) or vice versa.
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(Only S) (NI) and (Only S) (NI)
(I) (NI) and (I) (NI) and (Only B)
(I) (I) (Only B)
cB
cB
cB
cS cS cS
cS < cS
cB < cB
Figure 1: (when multiple equilibria, Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in bold)
Figure 2: Equilibrium regions (the Pareto dominant equilibrium is underlined).
Note that the condition for cB ≤ c¯B holds for some (αB, αS) if and only if
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) s ≥ 0, (1)
i.e. if the gains from trade are large enough and the dispersion of δ is low enough. Simi-
larly the condition for cS ≤ c¯S holds for some (αB, αS) if and only if
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) b ≥ 0. (2)
The two conditions cB ≤ c¯B and cS ≤ c¯S can simultaneously hold for some (αB, αS) if and
only if
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S) ≥ ρ (1− ρ) b
and
bρ (1− ρ)
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) s
ρ (1− ρ) s
(bρ+ B)− (sρ+ S)− ρ (1− ρ) b ≤ 1. (3)
In this case, the two conditions cB ≤ c¯B and cS ≤ c¯S hold simultaneously when (αB, αS) is
in some non-empty convex set.
2.3 Ranking of equilibria
Note that when cB ≤ c¯B (respectively, cS ≤ c¯S), there are complementarities between the
beliefs that the buyer (respectively, the seller) is informed, and the incentives of the buyer
(respectively, the seller) to become informed—as illustrated by the comparison of the in-
centives of the buyer (respectively, the seller) to acquire information in (NI) versus (Only
B) (respectively (NI) versus (Only S)).9 These complementarities lead to the existence of
regions where multiple equilibria coexist: (NI) and either (I), (Only S) or (Only B).
The equilibria can be partially Pareto-ranked under the conditions leading to their
coexistence. The equilibrium (NI) can potentially coexist with (I), (Only S) and (Only B).
9There are also complementarities between the seller’s and the buyer’s decisions to acquire
information—as illustrated by the comparison of the incentives of the buyer (resp. seller) to acquire infor-
mation in (NI) versus (Only S) (resp. (NI) versus (Only B))—although in this case, the buyer (resp. seller)
actually makes the same decision not to acquire information in both equilibria, even though his incentives
to acquire information are higher in the latter.
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The equilibrium (I) can never coexist with (Only S) and (Only B), except in the knife-edge
case where cB = c¯B and cS = c¯S. The same is true of the equilibria (Only S) and (Only B).
The following proposition formalizes these observations.
Proposition 5. (Pareto-Ranking of Equilibria). The equilibrium payoffs are ranked as follows:
vS(NI) ≥ max{vS(I), vS(Only S), vS(Only B)},
vB(NI) ≥ max{vB(I), vB(Only S), vB(Only B)}.
Therefore (NI) always Pareto dominates (I), (Only S), and (Only B) whenever they coexist.
The equilibrium with no information (NI) always dominates the equilibria with asym-
metric information (Only S) and (Only B) since it is more liquid. It also dominates the
equally liquid equilibrium with symmetric information (I) since it economizes on infor-
mation acquisition costs.
3 Tranching
Suppose that the payoff of the asset is ∆ + δ where ∆ is known, δ = 0 with probability
1− ρ and δ = 1 with probability ρ. To apply the analysis of Section 2, we define B and S
as b∆ and s∆, and so we can look at what happens when the asset is tranched into a pure
debt tranche (right to cash flow ∆) and a pure equity tranche (right to cash flow δ). To
sum up, the payoff for holding debt for the seller and the buyer are S = s∆ and B = b∆.
The payoffs to holding equity are sδ and bδ with δ ∈ {0, 1}.
The timing is as follows. First, the asset is tranched. Then, parties decide whether to
acquire information. Finally, bargaining takes place. Tranching thus has a direct effect
on trading. It also modifies the incentives to acquire information. We examine these two
effects in turn.
3.1 Tranching with exogenous information
We first analyze the properties of tranching when information is exogenous. In our propo-
sitions we focus for simplicity on the case where cB and cS are either 0 or ∞.
Observe that tranching is completely neutral if information is symmetric. Both the
debt and the equity parts are traded with probability 1 and the game has the exact same
equilibrium payoffs for all parties.
Proposition 6. (Neutrality of Tranching with Common Information). Consider the (I) equi-
librium (cB = 0 and cS = 0) or the (NI) equilibrium (cB = ∞ and cS = ∞). Under bundling,
trade occurs with probability 1. Under tranching, trade of both the safe and the risky tranche
occurs with probability 1. Bundling and tranching are Pareto-equivalent.
When there is commonality of information, there is no illiquidity and both the insula-
tion and the trading adjuvant effects have no bite.
By contrast, tranching is not neutral when information is asymmetric and trade only
occurs with some probability. Indeed, when information is asymmetric, the effect of
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tranching on liquidity is ambiguous. Tranching isolates a safe debt part that is completely
liquid (traded with probability one). Spinning off this safe tranche insulates it against the
distrust generated by the risky tranche. This tends to increase overall liquidity.
But tranching also makes the residual equity part riskier and hence less liquid. The
safe tranche no longer serves as an adjuvant in negotiations over the risk tranche. Another
way to say it is that spinning off the safe tranche lowers the cost of not trading the risky
tranche—the safe tranche no longer serves as a form of “mutual hostage”. This effect is
similar to the observation in Whinston (1990) that bundling leads to more competitive
pricing. This tends to reduce overall liquidity.
Thus the liquidity benefit of tranching is an insulation effect while the liquidity benefit
of bundling is a trading adjuvant effect. We illustrate these effects with two propositions,
starting with the insulation effect.
Proposition 7. (Insulation Effect of Tranching). We have the following.
i. Consider the (Only S) equilibrium (cB = ∞ and cS = 0). Under bundling, trade occurs
only if δ = 0. Under tranching, the safe tranche is traded with probability 1 but the equity
tranche is traded only if δ = 0. Tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
ii. Consider the (Only B) equilibrium (cB = 0 and cS = ∞). Under bundling, trade occurs
only if δ = 1. Under tranching, the safe tranche is traded with probability 1 but the equity
tranche is traded only if δ = 1. Tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
Proof. Note that under tranching, the safe tranche is always traded. The rest of the propo-
sition follows from the fact that the equivalent of Assumptions 2 and 3 for the risky
tranche, namely s > bρ and sρ > 0 are implied by Assumptions 2 and 3.
We continue with the trading adjuvant effect. This effect requires suspending As-
sumptions 2 and 3.
Proposition 8. (Trading Adjuvant Effect of Bundling). We have the following.
i. Assume that the weak version of Assumption 2 (Assumption 4) is violated so that (bρ +
B)− (s + S) > (1− ρ)(B− S). In addition, assume that s > bρ. Consider the (Only S)
equilibrium (cB = ∞ and cS = 0). Under bundling, trade occurs with probability 1. Under
tranching, the safe tranche is traded with probability 1 but the equity tranche is traded only
if δ = 0. The seller is better off under bundling than under tranching, and the buyer is
worse off under bundling than under tranching.
ii. Assume that the weak version of Assumption 3 (Assumption 5) is violated so that B > ρ(b+
B) + (1− ρ)S. Consider the (Only B) equilibrium (cB = 0 and cS = ∞). Under bundling,
trade occurs with probability 1. Under tranching, the safe tranche is traded with probability
1 but the equity tranche is traded only if δ = 1. The buyer is better off under bundling than
under tranching, and the seller is worse off under bundling than under tranching.
Proof. We treat the (Only S) equilibrium. The analysis for the (Only B) equilibrium is
similar.
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Consider first the case of bundling. The trade maximizing equilibrium can be de-
scribed as follows. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to bρ+ B and
sells the asset with probability 1. The seller is better off selling at that price even if δ = 1
because bρ+ B > s+ S. If the buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to s+ S and
buys the asset with probability 1. The other candidate price, S, leads to a lower payoff for
the buyer since (1− ρ)(B− S) < (bρ+ B)− (s + S). The payoffs are
vS = αS [bρ+ B] + αB [s + S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αB [(bρ+ B)− (s + S)] .
Consider now the case of tranching. Then the safe tranche is traded with probability
1, so we focus on the risky tranche. If the seller makes the offer, then he sets a price equal
to 0 and sells the risky tranche only if δ = 0 (in which case the risky tranche is worth 0
to both the buyer and the seller). The other candidate price, bρ, can be ruled out since
s > bρ which guarantees that if δ = 1, the seller does not want to sell at this price. If the
buyer makes the offer, then he sets a price equal to 0, and the seller accepts the offer only
if δ = 0 (in which case the risky tranche is worth 0 to both the buyer and the seller). Since
s > bρ, the other candidate price, s, is an inferior strategy for the buyer. The payoffs are
vS = αS [sρ+ B] + αB [sρ+ S] ,
vB = αS [0] + αB [B− S] .
It is apparent that the seller is better off under bundling and that the buyer is better
off under tranching.
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 8, bundling always increases liquidity. As a re-
sult, there are more gains from trade. However, these additional gains from trade are en-
tirely captured by the informed party. This emphasizes that bundling has both a trading
adjuvant effect and also a tilting of bargaining power effect that always favors the informed
party.
Actually, while bundling makes the informed party better off, it also makes the un-
informed party worse off. Intuitively, when the uninformed party makes the offer, it
prefers to propose a very attractive offer in order to trade the asset with probability 1
under bundling, whereas under tranching it can make a less attractive offer, trade the eq-
uity tranche only with some probability but trade the debt tranche with probability 1. In
other words, under bundling, the informed party extracts some surplus even when the
uninformed party makes the offer.
3.2 Tranching with endogenous information acquisition
When information acquisition is endogenous, tranching modifies the incentives to ac-
quire information. This plays out differently in different cases. Indeed, starting at some
bundling equilibrium, tranching can either increase or decrease the incentives to acquire
information. Whether this information effect of tranching enhances or hinders liquidity
depends on whether parties were both informed, asymmetrically informed, or both un-
informed at the original bundling equilibrium.
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For conciseness, we consider only the buyer’s incentives to acquire information, and
focus on the case where the seller is either uninformed (cS = ∞) or informed (cS = 0). We
make Assumptions 2 and 3 and so the insulation effect dominates the trading adjuvant
effect. Hence any eventual adverse effect of tranching must be due to the information
effect.
Recall that
c¯B = αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] ,
cB = αB (1− ρ) [sρ+ S− B] + αSρ (1− ρ) b.
As long as αB > 0, cB is decreasing in B− S and that c¯B is increasing in B− S, implying
that cB increases with tranching, and that c¯B decreases with tranching. We find it conve-
nient to indicate the dependence of these information thresholds on tranching with a (T),
for Tranching and on bundling with an (NT), for No Tranching. We have established the
following proposition.
Lemma 1. (Information Effect of Tranching). As long as αB > 0:
i. when cS = ∞, tranching increases the incentives of the uninformed buyer to become
informed in equilibrium (NI), cB(T) > cB(NT);
ii. when cS = 0, tranching reduces the incentives of the buyer to acquire information
in equilibrium (I), c¯B(T) < c¯B(NT).
Part (i) of the Lemma shows that at the equilibrium where both parties are uninformed
(NI), tranching increases the incentives of the buyer to acquire information. This is be-
cause at the (NI) equilibrium, the benefit of becoming informed for the buyer hinges on
refusing some trades. Under bundling, refusing trades for the risky tranche comes with
the collateral damage of not trading the safe tranche. This collateral damage is absent un-
der tranching—another implication of the trading adjuvant effect of bundling which dis-
appears under tranching. Therefore, refusing trades is less costly under tranching than
under bundling. This enhances the incentives of the buyer to become informed.10
Let us discuss Part (ii). At the equilibrium where both parties are informed (I), tranch-
ing reduces the incentives of the buyer to acquire information. This is because at the (I)
equilibrium, the benefit of becoming informed for the buyer hinges on the possibility of
making some trades. Under bundling, making trades for the risky tranche comes with the
collateral benefit of making trades for the safe tranche. This collateral benefit of bundling
10Indeed, when the seller makes an offer (probability αS) and the buyer identifies the asset as a lemon
δ = 0 (probability 1− ρ), the latter can simply turn down the trade. This increases his payoff compared to
the case where he does not acquire information by αS(1− ρ)[bρ+ B− B]. Similarly, when the buyer makes
an offer (probability αB), and identifies the asset as a lemon δ = 0 (probability 1− ρ), the buyer can simply
not make an offer. This increases his payoff compared to the case where he does not acquire information
by αB(1− ρ)[(sρ+ S)− B]. In the first case, the gain of the buyer from becoming informed is independent
of tranching. In the second case, under tranching, the buyer’s gain from becoming informed is increased
from αB(1− ρ)[(sρ+ S)− B] to αB(1− ρ)sρ: the buyer can still purchase the safe tranche and not make an
offer on the risky tranche.
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disappears under tranching. Tranching therefore reduces the incentives of the buyer to
acquire information.11
3.2.1 Uninformed seller (cS = ∞)
We start by analyzing the case where the seller is uninformed but the buyer can decide
to acquire information. This is the case considered by Dang et al (2011) and Yang (2011).
Note also that the case analyzed by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) is a particular case where
in addition cB = 0 so that the buyer is informed.
We now translate Lemma 1 into equilibrium predictions and show that, despite the
fact that making Assumptions 2 and 3 stacks the deck in favor of tranching, bundling
may dominate tranching once information is endogeneized.
Proposition 9. (Tranching with Uninformed Seller). Assume that cS = ∞, αB > 0 and
cB(T) < c¯B(T) (and so from Proposition 1, we have cB(NT) < c¯B(NT) as well). Then:
i. for cB ∈ [cB(NT), cB(T)), bundling Pareto-dominates tranching;
ii. for cB ∈ [0, cB(NT)), tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
Proof. Under both bundling and tranching, for cB < cB the only equilibrium is (Only B),
for cB ≤ cB ≤ c¯B, there are two possible equilibria (Only B) and (NI), and for c¯B < cB, the
only equilibrium is (NI). When cB ≤ cB ≤ c¯B, we select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium
(NI). Hence the equilibrium is (Only B) for cB < cB and (NI) for cB ≤ cB.
Lemma 1 shows that as long as αB > 0, we have cB(T) > cB(NT), so that (NI) is
more likely to be the equilibrium under bundling than under tranching. Indeed for cB ∈
[cB(NT), cB(T)), the equilibrium is (NI) under bundling and (Only B) under tranching.
Both parties are then better off under bundling than under tranching. This illustrates the
adverse information effect of tranching, which reduces overall liquidity by increasing the
incentives of the buyer to acquire information.
By contrast, when cB ∈ [0, cB(NT)), then the equilibrium is (Only B) under both
tranching and bundling. Both parties are then better off under tranching. This is a mani-
festation of the benefits of the insulation effect: tranching allows to trade the safe tranche
with probability 1.
3.2.2 Informed seller (cS = 0)
We now deal with the case where the seller is informed and the buyer can decide whether
to acquire information. Myers-Majluf (1984) and DeMarzo-Duffie (1999) can be consid-
ered as special cases where in addition cB = ∞ so that the buyer is uninformed.
11Indeed when the buyer makes an offer (probability αB), and the buyer identifies that δ = 1 (probability
ρ), he can offer s+ S and get the seller to sell him the asset yielding a benefit (b+ B)− (s+ S). If the buyer is
uninformed, he prefers not to generate that trade because he fears being sold a lemon δ = 0. An uninformed
buyer offers to pay S and the informed seller accepts if δ = 0. Hence acquiring information increases the
payoff of the buyer by αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)]. Under tranching, this gain is reduced to αBρ(b− s) because
an uninformed buyer can still buy the safe tranche at price S when confronted with an informed seller who
observes δ = 1.
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Proposition 10. (Tranching with Informed Seller). Assume that cS = 0 and αB > 0. Then:
i. for cB ∈ (c¯B(T), c¯B(NT)], the buyer is worse off and the seller is better off under bundling
than under tranching;
ii. for cB ∈ (c¯B(T), min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}], bundling increases total welfare vS + vB and
for cB ∈ (min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}, c¯B(NT)], bundling decreases total welfare vS + vB.
iii. for cB ∈ (c¯B(NT),∞), tranching Pareto-dominates bundling.
Proof. Under both bundling and tranching, for cB < c¯B the only equilibrium is (I), for
c¯B < cB, the only equilibrium is (Only S).
Lemma 1 shows that as long as αB > 0, we have c¯B(T) < c¯B(NT), so that (I) is
more likely to be the equilibrium under bundling than under tranching. Indeed for cB ∈
(c¯B(T), c¯B(NT)], the equilibrium is (I) under bundling and (Only S) under tranching. Us-
ing Lemma 2 in Appendix A.4, we know that under tranching, we have vB(I) ≥ vB(Only
S) if and only if cB ≤ c¯B(T). Using the fact that vB(I) is the same under tranching and
bundling, we conclude that the buyer is worse off under bundling. By contrast, the
seller is obviously better off. Lemma 2 in Appendix A.4 also shows that bundling in-
creases total welfare vS + vB for cB ∈ (c¯B(T), min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}] and decreases it for
cB ∈ (min{c¯B(NT), 1
αB
c¯B(T)}, c¯B(NT)].
By contrast, when cB ∈ (c¯B(NT),∞), then the equilibrium is (Only S) under both
tranching and bundling. Both parties are then better off under tranching. This is a mani-
festation of the benefits of the insulation effect: tranching allows to trade the safe tranche
with probability 1.
Case (i) in Proposition 9, and cases (i) and (ii) in Proposition 10 illustrate the adverse
information effect of tranching. When the seller is uninformed, tranching increases the
incentives of the buyer to acquire information. When the seller is informed, tranching de-
creases the incentives of the buyer to acquire information. In both cases, tranching works
against commonality and information and towards asymmetric information, to the detri-
ment of liquidity and welfare.
3.2.3 Tranching and commonality of information
We now provide a more general argument solidifying the intuition, provided in the intro-
duction, that tranching encourages information acquisition when it should be deterred
and discourages it when it should be promoted. We thereby also shed further light on
Lemma 1, and Propositions 9 and 10. The analysis relies on a simple convexity argument,
allows arbitrary tranching and does not require Assumptions 2 and 3.
Suppose that the asset is split into I tranches (i = 1, ..., I); each tranche i is composed
of a fraction xi of equity (cash-flow right on δ) and of a fraction yi of debt, such that
Σixi = Σiyi = 1. The seller and the buyer bargain over the entire bundle under bundling,
and enter piecemeal negotiations for each tranche under tranching.
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Proposition 11. (Tranching Works Against Commonality of Information)
i. If (NI) is an equilibrium under tranching, then (NI) is a fortiori an equilibrium under
bundling;
ii. if (I) is an equilibrium under tranching, then (I) is a fortiori an equilibrium under bundling.
Proof. We start with (i). Suppose that (NI) is an equilibrium. Let us compute the buyer’s
gain from information acquisition under tranching (GBT(NI)) and under bundling (G
B
NT(NI))
(the reasoning is symmetrical for the seller). Under tranching, when the seller makes the
offer, the seller offers price yiB+ xiρb for tranche i. The buyer’s gain from being informed
is then (1− ρ)xi(ρb), so the total gain over all tranches is Σi(1− ρ)xi(ρb) = (1− ρ)ρb, and
so is the same as under bundling. Suppose now that the buyer makes the offer. When un-
informed, the buyer offers yiS + xiρs for tranche i and this offer is accepted. The buyer’s
gain on tranche i from being informed is max{ai, 0}, where
ai ≡ (1− ρ) [yiS + xiρs− yiB] .
Under bundling the gain from being informed is max{a, 0}, where
a ≡ (1− ρ) [S + ρs− B] = Σiai.
And so,
GBT(NI) ≡ αBΣi max{ai, 0} ≥ GBNT(NI) ≡ αB max{Σiai, 0}.
We now deal with (ii). Suppose that (I) is an equilibrium and let us compute the losses
LBT(I) and L
B
NT(I) for the buyer from not being informed (again the reasoning is symmet-
rical for the seller).
With probability αS, the seller offers price B in the bad state and price B+ b in the good
state. The buyer has no surplus and therefore there is no loss from being uninformed
(besides, the offer reveals the state of nature). So suppose that the buyer makes the offer.
The loss for tranche i from not being informed is
ai ≡ (1− ρ)yi(B− S) + ρ [yi(B− S) + xi(b− s)]− yi(1− ρ)(B− S)
if yiρ(B− S) ≤ xi(s− ρb)
and
bi ≡ (1− ρ)yi(B− S) + ρ [yi(B− S) + xi(b− s)]− [yi(B− S) + xi(ρb− s)]
if yiρ(B− S) ≥ xi(s− ρb).
And so
LBT(I) ≡ αBΣi min{ai, bi} ≤ LBNT(I) ≡ αB min{Σiai,Σibi}.
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While it is instructive to compute actual gains and losses (in particular, we see that
both are associated with the possibility of making an offer), the reasoning in the proof
does not hinge on the exact expressions. The key insight is that the gain from becoming
informed in a non-informed equilibrium is linked to the possibility of refusing a disad-
vantageous trade (buying a lemon, selling a high quality asset). In this respect, tranching
offers more flexibility in the trade pattern and therefore a higher gain from deviating from
the non-informed equilibrium. Similarly, the loss associated with not being informed in
an informed equilibrium is associated with the possibility of either not trading or not cap-
turing the other side’s surplus. Minimizing this loss piecewise is easier than minimizing
it globally, and so the incentive to deviate from an informed equilibrium is greater under
tranching.
Finally, we note that we have taken the view that opportunities for trade are unaf-
fected by security design: The buyer, say, can buy the same overall security under tranch-
ing and bundling. For instance, an informed buyer can under tranching acquire in several
negotiations the various pieces of the whole bundle that he can acquire in a single negoti-
ation under bundling. In making this assumption, we implicitly follow the literatures on
market microstructure and on mechanism design. An opposite view would be that one
should cut securities in an arbitrary number of different tranches that would be traded by
different groups of agents; in such a world, it would be difficult to see how asymmetric
information would ever emerge, since the cost of acquiring information could never be
recouped through purchasing a tiny piece of the overall cake. In our view, the reason
why the formalism adopted in this section is more relevant is that there is in practice, a
second kind of information acquisition. Economic agents who trade an asset must have a
minimum amount of familiarity with the properties of this asset (as in Lester et al, forth-
coming). Thus, cutting into small pieces would create illiquidity rather than enhance
liquidity. We hope that future research will develop and clarify this line of thought, that
seems crucial for market microstructure and security design.
3.3 Discussion of the related literature
The security design literature is more general in some respects, and less general in some
others. Outcomes can usually take a continuum of values instead of being binary. And
optimal tranching involves mixing the safe part with as much equity as is consistent with
keeping the former liquid. On the other hand, the literature usually considers special
cases, as we do in this section (for example in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), cS = 0 and
cB = ∞). More importantly, the literature makes two key assumptions: (a) the seller has
full bargaining power (αS = 1); and (b) the seller can commit to sell some tranche and
keep the rest. Concerning this commitment assumption, note that the seller benefits from
selling the equity tranche after disposing of the safe one. Whether the seller is likely to be
able to abide to such a commitment to forego beneficial trades is context-dependent, and
we find both cases to be of interest.
Despite these differences, we can compare our results with those of the literature.
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) considers the case of an exogenously informed seller. Our
Assumption 2 corresponds to their assumption that the bundle leads to wasteful under-
trade; and Proposition 7 (i) is broadly consistent with their identification of the insulation
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effect.
Dang et al (2011) study the case of an uninformed seller (cS = ∞) and endogenous
information acquisition by the buyer (0 < cB < ∞). They find that, in contrast with the
analysis of this section, tranching always optimally deters information acquisition by the
buyer. The difference with Proposition 11 can be grasped by returning to assumptions
(a) and (b) stated above. To understand the role of the commitment assumption, suppose
that αS = 1. While tranching deters information acquisition by the buyer in Dang et al,
it is neutral with respect to information acquisition in our model: Recall that the buyer’s
incentive to acquire information in the (NI) equilibrium is the ability to refuse trading
when δ = 0. Regardless of how many tranches one constructs out of the bundle and of
how these tranches are structured, the total overcharging in the bad state of nature is equal
to ρb. And so the buyer’s incentive to acquire information is independent of financial
engineering. This is not so when the seller can commit not to trade (risky) tranches; the
buyer’s incentive to acquire information is then reduced. Second, when αB > 0, tranching
is no longer neutral as shown by Proposition 7 (i). Tranching enables the buyer to make a
finer use of his information, i.e. to pick and choose, and thereby encourages information
acquisition.
4 Re-trading
4.1 Dynamic model
In this section, we construct an infinite horizon dynamic-trading model à la Woodford
(1990). Agents are risk neutral and discount the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). They are of
one of two types: type 1 and type 2. Type-1 agents have investment opportunities in odd
periods. In those periods, they have access to a linear technology that yields an instanta-
neous unit return of R > 1. Type-2 agents have identical investment opportunities but in
even periods. Agents of type 1 (2) also have a large endowment of goods in even (odd)
periods.
Agents cannot borrow: when they have investment opportunities, they can only invest
up to their net worth. Together with the alternating investment opportunity structure, this
generates a demand for liquidity (stores of value). We assume that the supply of liquidity
is given by a unit mass of assets. These assets are Lucas trees with dividends δt in period
t. They provide liquidity, as they can be bought by type-1 agents at the end of an even
period, and sold to type-2 agents at the end of an odd period. We therefore refer to a
type-1 (type-2) agent in an odd period as a seller (buyer), and vice-versa in even periods.
The dividends take value 1 with probability ρ and 0 with probability 1− ρ, are i.i.d. across
assets and over time but the value of δt+1 can be learned one period in advance at t at a
cost cB (cS) for type-1 agents and cS (cB) for type-2 agents if t is even (odd).
We assume that asset sales and purchases are made asset by asset, in a decentralized
way. In every period, an asset held by an agent of a given type generates exactly one
opportunity to trade with an agent of the opposite type (two different assets owned by a
given agent of a given type generate meetings with different agents of the opposite type).
We detail the timing within each period. At the beginning of period t, the dividend δt is
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(type-1 agents convert any cash value v
they have into Rv)
Period t = 2k+ 1
Dividend
δt realized
Period t+ 1 = 2k+ 2
(type-2 agents convert
any cash value v they
have into Rv)
Seller (type 1)
and buyer
(type 2) meet;
can privately
learn value of
δt+1
Bargaining
stage
Dividend
δt+1 realized
· · ·
Figure 3: Timing of the dynamic model.
realized. Each asset then generates a trading opportunity with an agent of the opposite
type for its owner. Agents can then decide whether or not to become informed about this
asset’s next period dividend δt+1 by incurring an information cost. Then bargaining takes
place: the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability αS, and the buyer makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability αB = 1− αS.
We focus on stationary equilibria. We show that this dynamic framework can be
nested in the canonical model developed in the Section 2. This makes it possible to apply
the corresponding general results.
4.2 Stationary equilibria
Just like in the static model developed in Section 2, stationary equilibria are of four kinds:
(NI), (I), (Only S) and (Only B). The reader can get a grasp for the methodology by looking
at the (NI) case, and skip the other configurations, which employ very similar reasoning.
Non-Informed equilibrium (NI). In the (NI) equilibrium, agents do not acquire infor-
mation. Every asset changes hands in a given period t for all values of δt+1. Let p and p de-
note the prices when the seller and the buyer make offers, respectively. Let p ≡ αS p+ αB p.
We denote by VS the ex-dividend value of an asset for a seller.
A buyer’s net valuation for the asset is
β[Rδt+1 +VS]− pt
and a seller’s net valuation for the asset is
Rpt − β[δt+1 + β[Rρ+VS]]
where we have made use of the no-trade theorem, namely that if at date t, a seller does
not sell to the buyer (bargaining breakdown), this seller has buyer preferences at date
(t + 1) and so keeps the asset until date (t + 2).
The prices p, p and p¯ and the ex-dividend value of an asset for a seller are determined
by the following equations. First, p is equal to reservation value of the buyer:
p¯ = β(ρR +VS).
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Second, p is equal to the reservation value of the seller.
p = (β/R)[ρ+ β(ρR +VS)].
Third, the average price p is the weighted average of p and p¯, the weights being given by
the probabilities αS and αB:
p ≡ αS p¯ + αB p.
Finally, the ex-dividend value of the asset for a seller is simply given by the product of
the rate of return R and the average price p of the asset:
VS = Rp.
This forms a system of four equations and four unknowns. The prices p, p and p¯ can
be directly computed using these equations once VS is known. In turn, those equations
can be manipulated to show that VS is the solution of the fixed-point equation
VS = TNI(VS)
where the fixed-point operator TNI is defined by
TNI(VS) ≡ RαSβ(ρR +VS) + RαB(β/R)[ρ+ β(ρR +VS)].
The solution can be found in closed form:12
p =
αSR + αB(1+ βR)/R
1− αSβR− αBβ2 βρ,
VS =
αSR + αB(1+ βR)/R
1− αSβR− αBβ2 βRρ.
Informed equilibrium (I). In the (I) equilibrium, agents acquire information. Every
asset changes hands in a given period t for all values of δt+1. We denote by p, p¯ and p the
average prices at which trades occur (averaged over the realizations of δt+1). We denote
by VS the ex-dividend value of an asset for a seller.
We now have the following equations:
p¯ = β(ρR +VS − cS),
p =
β
R
[ρ+ β(ρR +VS − cS)],
p = αS p¯ + αB p,
12In these formulas, and the corresponding formulas for the other equilibria, we assume that the de-
nominators are strictly positive. A necessary and sufficient condition for all denominators to be positive is
1− αSβR− αBβ2 > 0.
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VS = Rp.
This forms a system of four equations and four unknowns. The prices p, p and p can
be directly computed using these equations once VS is known. In turn, those equations
can be manipulated to show that VS is the solution of the fixed-point equation
VS = T I(VS)
where the fixed-point operator T I is defined by
T I(VS) ≡ RαSβ(ρR +VS − cS) + RαB β
R
[ρ+ β(ρR +VS − cS)].
The solution can be found in closed form:
p =
αSβ(ρR− cS) + αB βR [ρ+ β(ρR− cS)]
1− αSβR− αBβ2 ,
VS =
αSβR(ρR− cS) + αBβ[ρ+ β(ρR− cS)]
1− αSβR− αBβ2 .
(Only S) equilibrium. In the (Only S) equilibrium, in a given period, only the seller
acquires information. The asset changes hands in a given period t if and only if δt+1 = 0.
We denote by p, p¯ and p the prices at which trades occur if they occur (that is if δt+1 = 0).
We denote by VS the ex-dividend value of an asset for a seller.
We have the following equations:
p¯ = β(VS − cS),
p =
β
R
[β(ρR +VS − cS)],
p = αS p¯ + αB p,
VS = ρ
[
β+ β2(ρR +Vs − cS)
]
+ (1− ρ)Rp.
This forms a system of four equations and four unknowns. The prices p, p and p can be
directly computed using these equations once VS is known. In turn, those equations can
be manipulated to show that VS is the solution of the fixed-point equation
VS = TOnlyS(VS)
where the fixed-point operator TOnlyS is defined by
TOnlyS(VS) ≡ ρ
[
β+ β2(ρR +Vs − cS)
]
+(1− ρ)R
[
αSβ(VS − cS) + αB β
R
[β(ρR +VS − cS)]
]
.
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The solution can be found in closed form:
p =
αS
[
ρβ2(1+ ρβR)− βcS]+ αB [ρβ2 ( βR + 1)− β2R cS]
1− ρβ2 − β(1− ρ)(αSR + αBβ) ,
VS =
ρ
[
β+ β2(ρR− cS)]+ (1− ρ)R [−αSβcS + αB β2R (ρR− cS)]
1− ρβ2 − (1− ρ)β (αSR + αBβ) .
(Only B) equilibrium. In the (Only B) equilibrium, in a given period, only the buyer
acquires information. The asset changes hands in a given period t if and only if δt+1 = 1.
We denote by p, p¯ and p the prices at which trades occur if they occur (that is if δt+1 = 1).
We denote by VS the ex-dividend value of an asset for a seller.
We have the following equations:
p¯ = β(R +VS),
p =
β
R
[1+ β(ρR +VS)],
p = αS p¯ + αB p,
VS = ρRp + (1− ρ)β2(ρR +VS).
This forms a system of four equations and four unknowns. The prices p, p and p can be
directly computed using these equations once VS is known. In turn, those equations can
be manipulated to show that VS is the solution of the fixed-point equation
VS = TOnlyB(VS)
where the fixed-point operator TOnlyB is defined by
TOnlyB(VS) ≡ ρR
[
αSβ(R +VS) + αB
β
R
[1+ β(ρR +VS)]
]
+ (1− ρ)β2(ρR +VS).
The solution can be found in closed form:
p = β
αS[R[1− (1− ρ)β2] + (1− ρ)ρβ2R] + αB[1−(1−ρ)β2R + βρ]
1− (1− ρ)β2 − βρ(αSR + αBβ) ,
VS = ρR
αSβR + αB βR (1+ βρR) + (1− ρ)β2
1− (1− ρ)β2 − βρ(αSR + αBβ) .
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4.3 Mapping the dynamic model to the static one
In all these candidate stationary equilibria, the payoffs from buying and selling, acquiring
information or not are the same as in the static model considered in Section 2, for partic-
ular values of b, s, B and S. In other words, we can find a simple mapping from VS to b,
s, B and S. This mapping is the same across all stationary equilibria, up to information
acquisition costs in the case of I and OnlyS. To represent this dependence, we introduce
an indicator variable 1{I,OnlyS} that takes the value 1 for the equilibria (I) and (Only S)
and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 12. (Mapping the Dynamic Model). For every stationary equilibrium (NI), (I),
(Only S) and (Only B), the dynamic model can be mapped to the static model. The associated
values of b, s, B, and S are given by:
b = βR,
s =
β
R
,
B = β
(
VS − cS1{I,OnlyS}
)
,
S =
β2
R
(ρR +VS − cS1{I,OnlyS}).
It is important to note that the coefficients b and s are independent of the equilibrium.
By contrast, B and S depend on the equilibrium. More precisely, B and S depend on
the continuation equilibrium. We will make heavy use of this important observation in
Section 4.5. A sufficient statistic for the dependence of B and S on the continuation equi-
librium for t ≥ 1 is given by VS − cS1{I,OnlyS}, the ex-dividend value of the asset for a
seller net of the information cost for the seller if the seller acquires information in equi-
librium. Moreover B, S and B− S are increasing in VS − cS1{I,OnlyS}. Note that only the
information cost for the seller cS but not the information cost for the buyer cB may en-
ter in these formula. This is because the relevant buyer’s information decisions are sunk
whenever a buyer enters a negotiation with a seller (only his future decision to become
informed when he turns into a seller in the next period is relevant to his valuation of the
asset).
Proposition 13. (Satisfying the Assumptions of the Associated Static Model). Assump-
tion 1 is always satisfied as long as R ≥ 1. There exists R¯ > 1 such that for all R ∈ [1, R¯),
Assumptions 2 and 3 of the static model associated with the stationary equilibria (NI), (I), (Only
S) and (Only B) are satisfied whenever these equilibria exist.
For R low enough, the gains from trade are small enough that there are inefficiencies
when parties are asymmetrically informed—which is the content of Assumptions 2 and
3.
Given these values of B and S, we can compute the associated values of cB, c¯B, cS and
c¯S for the different stationary equilibria that we have considered:
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cS = αBρ (1− ρ) s + αSρ [(s + S)− (bρ+ B)] ,
cB = αB (1− ρ) [sρ+ S− B] + αSρ (1− ρ) b,
c¯S = αS (1− ρ) [B− S] ,
c¯B = αBρ [(b + B)− (s + S)] .
Once again, in interpreting these information thresholds, it is important to keep in mind
that these thresholds now depend on the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1. We some-
times emphasize the dependence of VS, B, S, cB, c¯B, cS and c¯S, by explicitly writing these
thresholds as functions. For example, we sometimes write VS(NI) or c¯B(NI) to denote
the values of VS and c¯B when the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is (NI).
The existence conditions for the different stationary equilibria can then be derived
exactly as in the static model. A detailed derivation is provided in Propositions 16 and
17 in Appendix A.2. This characterization is valid under the additional conditions that
R ∈ [1, ¯¯R), β ∈ ( ¯¯β, 1), (αB, αS) are such that αBβ > 1 − ρ, αSβ > 1 − ρ, and 2αS <
3 + 2ρ(1− ρ)−√(3+ 2ρ(1− ρ))2 − 8ρ, where ¯¯R ∈ (1, R¯), and ¯¯β ∈ (0, 1). In the rest of
the paper, unless stated otherwise, we always assume that these conditions are verified
when we consider the dynamic version of the model.
4.4 Prices and liquidity across equilibria
It is useful to compare the value of VS across equilibria.
Proposition 14. (Dynamic Liquidity and Asset Prices). The more information is common,
and the less information is acquired, the higher the ex-dividend value VS of an asset for the seller.
More precisely, whenever (NI) and another equilibrium (E) ∈ {I, Only S, Only B} coexist, we
have
VS(NI) ≥ max{VS(E)}.
Moreover whenever (I) and (Only S) coexist, we have
VS(I) ≥ VS(Only S).
That VS(NI) ≥ VS(I) reflects the fact that the (NI) equilibrium economizes on infor-
mation costs. These costs are capitalized and reflected in the value of the asset so that
p(NI) ≥ p(I): an asset is more valuable today if it can be sold without needing to ac-
quire information in the future. In other words, decreasing information acquisition while
preserving commonality of information increases asset prices and welfare.
That VS(NI) is greater than VS(Only S) and VS(Only B) is the result of three effects:
first, (NI) is more liquid today, and hence leads to more efficient trading; second, (NI) is
more liquid in the future, which enhances the value of the asset today and creates greater
gains from trade today; third, (NI) economizes on sellers’ information costs. That VS(I)
is greater than VS(Only S) is also the result of the same first two effects ((Only S) econo-
mizes on buyers’ information costs, but those are not capitalized in VS). The comparison
between VS(Only B) and VS(I) (or VS(Only S)) is ambiguous and depends on the value
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of the information acquisition cost cS. This is because the three aforementioned effects
depend on cS.
Note that (I) and (Only S), and similarly (I) and (Only S) can now coexist in the dy-
namic model, which was not the case in the static model. This is because the correspond-
ing information thresholds are endogenous to the continuation equilibrium through the
values of B and S, which were instead exogenous in the static model.
4.5 Dynamic Self-Fulfilling Liquidity
Let us analyze the impact of expectations regarding future liquidity on contemporaneous
liquidity. One way to approach this question is to consider simple equilibria of the dy-
namic game where the continuation equilibrium is independent of the date (stationary).
More precisely, we assume that independently of the actions taken at t = 0, the equilib-
rium from t = 1 on is the same stationary equilibrium, either (NI), (I), (Only S) or (Only
B). We can then analyze how the set of equilibria at t = 0 changes as we vary the contin-
uation equilibrium for t ≥ 1. For example, we can ask how the conditions of existence of
(NI) at t = 0 change depending on whether (NI) or (Only B) is played for t ≥ 1.
Given a continuation equilibrium, the set of equilibria is identical to the one of the
static game we analyzed in Section 2, for some specific values of b, s, B and S. The key
is that B and S now depend on the continuation equilibrium. This dependence turns
out to be exactly the one outlined above in Section 4.3. We can then simply analyze the
dependence of the information thresholds cB, c¯B, cS and c¯S of the static game on B and
S. There are many equilibrium thresholds. For simplicity and in the interest of space, we
focus on the case where cS ∈ {0,∞} or cB ∈ {0,∞}.
Proposition 15. (Dynamic Self-Fulfilling Liquidity). The dependence of the information
thresholds at t = 0 on the continuation equilibrium (NI), (I), (Only S) and (Only B) for t ≥ 1 is
as follows, as long as the corresponding continuation equilibria exist for t ≥ 1:
i. (cS = ∞) cB(NI) ≤ cB(Only B) with a strict inequality if and only if 0 < αB < 1, so that
the (NI) equilibrium is more likely to exist at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1
is (NI) than if it is (Only B);
ii. (cB = ∞) cS(NI) ≤ cS(OnlyS) with strict inequality if and only if αB < 1, so that the
(NI) equilibrium is more likely to exist at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is
(NI) than if it is (Only S).;
iii. (cS = 0) c¯B(OnlyS) ≤ c¯B(I) with a strict inequality if and only if αB > 0, so that (I) is
more likely to exist at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is (I) than if it is (Only
S);
iv. (cB = 0) c¯S(OnlyB) ≤ c¯S(I) with a strict inequality if and only if αS > 0, so that (I) is
more likely to exist at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is (I) than if it is (Only
B).
Consider first the case of an uninformed seller (cS = ∞). If (NI) is the continuation
equilibrium for t ≥ 1, then the condition for the existence of the equilibrium (NI) at
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t = 0 is cB ≥ cB(NI). Similarly, if (Only B) is the continuation equilibrium for t ≥
1, then the condition for the existence of (NI) at t = 0 is cB ≥ cB(OnlyB). Part (i) of
Proposition 15 states that cB(NI) ≤ cB(OnlyB). This means that the (NI) equilibrium is
more likely to exist at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is (NI) than if it is
(Only B). This is because the (ex-dividend) value of the asset Vs is higher under (NI) than
under (Only B). Intuitively, the asset is expected to be more liquid under (NI) than under
(Only B). This in turn increases the gains from trading the asset at t = 0. But the only
reason for a buyer to acquire information at t = 0 is to use this information to turn down
disadvantageous trades. The gains from trade are higher under (NI) than under (Only
B). Hence the incentives for a buyer to acquire information under (NI) are lower than
under (Only B). In other words, when the seller is not informed, the buyer is less likely
to acquire information at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is (NI) than if it is
(Only B).
Consider now the case of an informed seller (cS = 0). If (I) is the continuation equi-
librium for t ≥ 1, then the condition for the existence of (I) is cB ≤ c¯B(I). If (Only S)
is the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1, then the condition for the existence of (I) is
cB ≤ c¯B(OnlyS). Part (iii) of Proposition 15 shows that c¯B(OnlyS) ≤ c¯B(I), establishing
that (I) is more likely to exist at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is (I) than
if it is (Only S).
Parts (ii) and (iv) of Proposition 15 can be used to establish similar dynamic self-
fulfilling liquidity results in the case of an uninformed buyer (cB = ∞) and the case of
an informed buyer (cB = 0). In the case of an uninformed buyer, (NI) is more likely to ex-
ist at t = 0 if the continuation equilibrium for t ≥ 1 is (NI) than if it is (Only S). In the case
of an informed buyer, (I) is more likely to exist at t = 0, if the continuation equilibrium
for t ≥ 1 is (I) than if it is (Only B).
These results illustrate an important dynamic aspect of liquidity in our model. Through
an information channel, liquidity is dynamically self-fulfilling. The expectation of liquid-
ity tomorrow increases liquidity today.
4.6 Tranching
We can directly apply our results to the dynamic model using the mapping to the static
model. The interpretation is the following. We are considering the impact of tranching
at date t, once the period-t dividend δt has been paid. The asset is tranched into a claim
on δt+1 and a separate claim on future dividends δt+2, δt+3,... No further tranching is
allowed. All the results derived in this section for the static model (Lemma 1 and Propo-
sitions 9 and 10) can then be applied to the dynamic model for the form of tranching that
we have just detailed.
We can also derive results for a different form of tranching, where in every period t (as
opposed to only in one period), the asset is tranched into a claim to δt+1 and a separate
claim to future dividends δt+2, δt+3,...The results for this model are almost identical. The
only difference is that part (ii) of Proposition 10 needs to be modified as follows: for
cB ∈ (c¯B(T), min{c¯B(NT), cˆB}], bundling increases total welfare vS + vB and for cB ∈
(min{c¯B(NT), cˆB}, c¯B(NT)], bundling decreases total welfare vS + vB, where a different
threshold cˆB takes the place of 1
αB
c¯B(T) in these expressions (this threshold cˆB is defined
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by the condition that total welfare vS + vB is the same under tranching and under no
tranching).13 The proofs of these results are omitted for brevity.
5 Conclusion
The paper analyzed bundling with common values and endogenous information. Af-
ter pitting the insulation effect (tranching confines and liquefies the safe part) against
the trading adjuvant effect (bundling makes the risky part more liquid), the paper’s first
substantive contribution was to show that tranching always has adverse welfare effects
on information acquisition: Tranching reduces a party’s cost of not trading and there-
fore works against the commonality of information and thereby against the realization
of gains from trade. As a result, tranching encourages (discourages) information acqui-
sition when it should be deterred (encouraged). The paper provides conditions under
which tranching reduces welfare even when the insulation effect dominates the trading
adjuvant effect.
Focusing on the structured finance application of the model, we then studied repeated
trading of an asset. The faster the asset circulates, the more useful it is as a store of value.
The paper’s second contribution was thus to measure the velocity of assets that are re-
peatedly traded. The dynamic model can be nested into the static one, enabling us to
make use of existing results. The central insight is that liquidity is self-fulfilling: A per-
ception of future illiquidity creates current illiquidity. Insights on velocity are shown to
be closely related to those on tranching.
The focus of this paper leaves many alleys open to future research. One of the most
challenging, but also potentially most rewarding ones is to embody these considerations
in a general equilibrium framework with a shortage of stores of value. Endogenously
varying demand for liquidity impacts the velocity of existing stores of value and there-
fore the supply of liquidity. Another extension would look at security design once the
veil of ignorance is lifted. The issuer then would use security design to signal underlying
security values, as in Nachman and Noe (1994). Yet another worthwhile line of inves-
tigation would try to find conditions under which the standard assumption of learning
by holding (made e.g. in Plantin (2009) and papers assuming that the seller is superiorly
informed) is likely to hold; while seller’s superiority of information is natural in primary
markets, it is arguably less so in secondary markets. A fourth extension would allow for
a larger set of information acquisition strategies. We have followed much of the literature
in assuming that the parties can acquire a piece of information about the value of the as-
set; this was natural in our binary-state environment. Had we considered a continuum of
outcomes, say, we could have allowed, in the spirit of Yang (2011) and the rational inat-
tention literature, parties to focus their attention on specific regions of the outcome space;
the impact of tranching on focused attention is an interesting alley for research.
Finally, the introduction has stressed that the framework and questions apply well be-
yond the realm of security design. It clearly would be worth extending and applying the
results to policy-making in industrial organization, politics, international negotiations,
13One can show that cˆB ≤ 1
αB
c¯B(T).
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compensation design or financial regulation. We hope that these and other topics related
to this paper will be investigated in future research.
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A Appendix for Section 4
We will make repeated use of the following observation. If a given continuation equi-
librium for t ≥ 1 exists, then the corresponding value for the continuation equilibrium
satisfies VS ≥ ρβ(1+βR)1−β2 , where the RHS is the ex-dividend value that a seller would obtain
if he kept the asset forever.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 13
Checking Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. We have just described how every stationary equi-
librium can be associated with a particular parametrization of the static model. We now
proceed to derive conditions on the primitives of the dynamic model such that Assump-
tions 1, 2, and 3 in the associated static model are verified.
We start with Assumptions 1: b ≥ s and B ≥ S. Note that for all equilibria, we have
b > s. The condition that B > S amounts to
VS − cS1{I,OnlyS} >
ρβR
R− β .
We can use the lower bound VS − cS1{I, Only S} ≥ ρβ(1+βR)1−β2 (which holds across all
equilibria), to conclude that this inequality is always verified as long as R > 1, so that we
have B > S.
We move on to Assumptions 2 and 3: S + s > B + ρb and ρs > B− S. These assump-
tions are equivalent to
ρβR + 1− ρR2
R− β > V
S − cS1{I,OnlyS}
and
ρ
βR + 1
R− β > V
S − cS1{I,OnlyS}.
In light of the results below, namely that VS(NI) ≥ max{VS(Only B), VS(Only S), VS(I)},
it suffices to check that these assumptions are verified for (NI). We get the following con-
dition for Assumption 2:
ρβR + 1− ρR2 > αSβR + αBβ [ρR + (1− ρ) β] . (4)
Similarly, we get the following condition for Assumption 3:
βR + 1 > αSβR
(
R2 + 1
)
+ αBβR(1+ βR). (5)
In order for Assumption 2 to be verified, ρ should not be too large and R should not
be too large. In order for Assumption 3 to be verified, R should not be too large (this
condition is independent of ρ).
Note also that for R = 1, these conditions become respectively
1+ β > αSβ.
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and
1 > αSβ+ αBβ2,
so that they are automatically verified. Hence Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are guaranteed to
hold as long as R is close enough to 1.
A.2 Equilibrium regions for the dynamic model
The conditions for the existence of (NI) are cB ≥ cB(NI) and cS ≥ cS(NI), and the con-
ditions for the existence of (Only B) are cB ≤ c¯B(Only B) and cS ≥ c¯S(Only B). However
we encounter the following complication for equilibria (I and Only S): for those equi-
libria, B, S and hence the corresponding information thresholds c¯B(I), c¯B(Only S), c¯S(I),
c¯S(Only S) depend on cS. This poses no particular problem, and the existence conditions
for the equilibria can be expressed exactly as before. However, it is useful to solve out
these conditions further. No change is required for the buyer’s information thresholds
c¯B(I), c¯B(Only S), one should simply bear in mind that they now depend on cS. For the
seller’s information thresholds, we find it more useful to derive two thresholds cˆS(I) and
cˆS(Only S) that are independent of cS.14 Hence cS ≤ c¯S(I) if and only if cS ≤ cˆS(I) and
cS ≤ c¯S(OnlyS) if and only if cS ≤ cˆS(OnlyS). The conditions for the existence of (I)
are then cB ≤ c¯B(I) and cS ≤ cˆS(I), and the conditions for the existence of (Only S) are
cB ≥ c¯B(Only S) and cS ≤ cˆS(Only S).
The number of relevant regions in the information cost space (cS, cB) ∈ R+2 is higher
than in the static case because the information thresholds now depend on the equilibrium.
For completeness, we list them all in Proposition 17 below. This involves describing the
boundaries of a large number of regions of the information cost space. For ease of expo-
sition, we focus here on the case cS = 0 (informed seller) and cS = ∞ (uninformed seller)
in Proposition 16 below, and refer the reader to Proposition 17 for the complete treatment
and the proofs of these propositions.
Proposition 16. (Equilibrium Regions for the Dynamic Model). There exists ¯¯R ∈ (1, R¯), and
¯¯β ∈ (0, 1) such that for all R ∈ (1, ¯¯R) and β ∈ ( ¯¯β, 1), and all (αB, αS) such that αBβ > 1− ρ
and αSβ > 1− ρ, we have cB(NI) ≤ c¯B(Only B) and:
i. When cS = 0 (informed seller), we have c¯B(Only S) < c¯B(I) and
(a) for cB ∈ [0, c¯B(Only S)), (I) is the only stationary equilibrium;
(b) for cB ∈ [c¯B(Only S), c¯B(I)], (I) and (Only S) are the only stationary equilibria;
14These information thresholds can be computed as follows:
cˆS(I) =
αSρ(1− ρ)β2(R− β)
[
αS((R− β)2 − 1) + β(1− βR )
]
R [1− β(αBβ+ αS(R− β(1− ρ)(R− β)))] ,
cˆS(Only S) =
β2ρ(1− ρ)αSβ(R2 − 1)
R
[
1− ρβ2 − (1− ρ)β(αSR + αBβ) + αS(1− ρ)β(1− βR )
] .
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(c) for cB ∈ (c¯B(I),∞), (Only S) is the only stationary equilibrium;
ii. When cS = ∞ (uninformed seller), we have
(a) for cB ∈ [0, cB(NI)) (Only B) is the only stationary equilibrium;
(b) for cB ∈ [cB(NI), c¯B(Only B)] (Only B) and (NI) are the only stationary equilibria;
(c) for cB ∈ (c¯B(Only B),∞) (NI) is the only stationary equilibrium;
We now provide a generalization of Proposition 16 without restricting ourselves to the
cases cS = 0 and cS = ∞ and its proof.
Proposition 17. (Equilibrium Regions for the Dynamic Model). There exists ¯¯R ∈ (1, R¯), and
¯¯β ∈ (0, 1) such that for all R ∈ (1, ¯¯R) and β ∈ ( ¯¯β, 1), and all (αB, αS) such that αBβ > 1− ρ,
αSβ > 1− ρ, and 2αS < 3 + 2ρ(1− ρ) −√(3+ 2ρ(1− ρ))2 − 8ρ, we have cˆS(Only S) <
c¯S(Only B) < cˆS(I) and cB(NI) ≤ c¯B(Only B) and:
i. For cS ∈ [0, cS(NI)), c¯B(Only S) < c¯B(I) and
(a) for cB ∈ [0, c¯B(Only S)), (I) is the only stationary equilibrium;
(b) for cB ∈ [c¯B(Only S), c¯B(I)], (I) and (Only S) are the only stationary equilibria;
(c) for cB ∈ (c¯B(I),∞), (Only S) is the only stationary equilibrium;
ii. For cS ∈ [cS(NI), cˆS(Only S)], c¯B(OnlyS) < c¯B(I) and
(a) for cB ∈ [0, cB(NI)), (I) is the only stationary equilibrium;
(b) for cB ∈ [cB(NI), c¯B(Only S)), (NI) and (I) are the only stationary equilibria;
(c) for cB ∈ [c¯B(Only S), c¯B(I)], (NI), (I) and (Only S) are the only stationary equilibria;
(d) for cB ∈ (c¯B(I),∞), (NI) and (Only S) are the only stationary equilibria;
iii. For cS ∈ (cˆS(Only S), c¯S(Only B)),
(a) for cB ∈ [0, cB(NI)), (I) is the only stationary equilibrium;
(b) for cB ∈ [cB(NI), c¯B(I)], (I) and (NI) are the only stationary equilibria;
(c) for cB ∈ (c¯B(I),∞), (NI) is the only stationary equilibrium;
iv. For cS ∈ [c¯S(Only B), cˆS(I)), c¯B(Only B) < c¯B(I) and
(a) for cB ∈ [0, cB(NI)) (I) and (Only B) are the only stationary equilibria;
(b) for cB ∈ [cB(NI), c¯B(Only B)] (I), (Only B) and (NI) are the only stationary equilib-
ria;
(c) for cB ∈ (c¯B(Only B), c¯B(I)] (I) and (NI) are the only stationary equilibria;
(d) for cB ∈ (c¯B(I),∞) (NI) is the only stationary equilibrium;
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v. For cS ∈ [cˆS(I),∞),
(a) for cB ∈ [0, cB(NI)) (Only B) is the only stationary equilibrium;
(b) for cB ∈ [cB(NI), c¯B(Only B)] (Only B) and (NI) are the only stationary equilibria;
(c) for cB ∈ (c¯B(Only B),∞) (NI) is the only stationary equilibrium;
We derive a number of conditions for the ranking of the information thresholds cor-
responding to different stationary equilibria. The proposition follows using the existence
conditions associated with these information thresholds.
Conditions for
cS(NI) ≤ min{c¯S(Only S), c¯S(Only B),c¯S(I)}
and
cB(NI) ≤ min{c¯B(Only S), c¯B(Only B),c¯B(I)}.
We use the following two functions of (B− S)
φc¯S(B− S) = αS(1− ρ)(B− S),
φcS(B− S) = ρ
[
(1− ρ)s− αS (B− S− ρ(b− s))
]
.
Using the fact that b and s are independent across equilibria,
b = βR,
s =
β
R
,
we see that φc¯S is increasing, φcS decreasing, and the two functions cross at B− S = X =
ρ(1−ρ)β
αSR − ρ2β
(
R− 1R
)
. Now we have
B− S = β
(
1− β
R
)(
VS − cS1{I,OnlyS}
)
− β2ρ.
In Appendix A.3, we show that VS(NI) is greater than VS(I), VS(Only S) and VS(Only B).
Hence a necessary condition for cS(NI) ≤ min{c¯S(Onlfigure
S), c¯S(Only B),c¯S(I)} is that at (NI), B− S be greater than X. This is equivalent to
β
(
1− β
R
)
αSR2 + αB(1+ βR)
1− αSβR− αBβ2 >
1− ρ
αSR
− ρ
(
R− 1
R
− 1
)
. (6)
Once this condition is verified, a sufficient condition for cS(NI) ≤ min{c¯S(Only S),
c¯S(Only B), c¯S(I)} is that for (I), (Only S), and (Only B), B − S be greater than X. Us-
ing the lower bound VS − cS1{I,Only S} ≥ ρβ(1+βR)1−β2 , we find that a sufficient condition
is
β
(
1− β
R
)
ρβ(1+ βR)
1− β2 − β
2ρ >
1− ρ
αSR
− ρ
(
R− 1
R
− 1
)
, (7)
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which implies (6).
Similarly, a sufficient condition for cB(NI) ≤ min{c¯B(Only S), c¯B(Only B), c¯B(I)} is
β
(
1− β
R
)
ρβ(1+ βR)
1− β2 − β
2ρ > ρβ
[
R
(
1− ρ
αB
+ ρ− 2
)
+
2− ρ
R
]
(8)
Hence (7) is a sufficient condition for cS(NI) ≤ min{c¯S(Only S), c¯S(Only B),c¯S(I)}
and (8) is a sufficient condition for cB(NI) ≤ min{c¯B(Only S), c¯B(Only B),c¯B(I)}.
When R = 1, these sufficient conditions become respectively
αSβ > 1− ρ,
αBβ > 1− ρ.
Since Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are automatically verified when R = 1, we conclude that
for R close enough to 1, we can have at the same time Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and cS(NI) ≤
min{c¯S(Only S), c¯S(Only B),c¯S(I)}, cB(NI) ≤ min{c¯B(Only S), c¯B(Only B),c¯B(I)}.
Conditions for c¯S(Only B) ≤ cS∗.
We define cS∗ to be the value of cS for which VS(I) = VS(Only S): cS∗ = (R
2−1)[1−(1−ρ)(αBβ+αSR)]
R−β .
We can check that VS(I) > VS(Only S) if and only if cS < cS∗.
The condition for c¯S(Only B) ≤ cS∗ is
αSρ(1− ρ)β2(R2 − 1)(αSR + αBβ)
R(1− (1− ρ)β2 − βρ(αSR + αBβ)) ≤
(R2 − 1)(1− (1− ρ)β(αBβ+ αSR))
R− β .
Let X = αBβ+ αSR. We can rewrite this condition as
ρ(1− ρ)β2αSRX− ρ(1− ρ)β3αSX
≤ R
[
1− (1− ρ)β2 − βρX− (1− ρ)βX + (1− ρ)2β3X + ρ(1− ρ)β2X2
]
,
which becomes when R→ 1,
ρ(1− ρ)β2αSX(1− β) ≤ 1− (1− ρ)β2− βρX− (1− ρ)βX + (1− ρ)2β3X + ρ(1− ρ)β2X2.
(9)
The LHS and the RHS of equation (9) are equal for β = 1. We can now derive a condition
for the derivative of the LHS with respect to β for β = 1 to be greater than the derivative
of the RHS for β = 1:
(αS)2 − αS(3+ 2ρ(1− ρ)) + 2ρ > 0.
Hence we have c¯S(Only B) ≤ cS∗ for R and β close enough to 1 as long as
2αS < 3+ 2ρ(1− ρ)−
√
(3+ 2ρ(1− ρ))2 − 8ρ.
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Conditions for c¯S(OnlyB) ≤ cˆS(I). It is easy to see that when R = 1, we have c¯S(Only
B) = 0 while cˆS(I) > 0. This shows that c¯S(Only B) ≤ cˆS(I) for R close enough to 1.
Conditions for cˆS(OnlyS) ≤ c¯S(OnlyB). Using X = αBβ + αSR, we find that cˆS(Only
S) ≤ c¯S(Only B) if and only if
X + (1− ρ)β(β2 − X2) + αS(1− ρ)β(1− β
R
)X ≥ β,
which becomes when R→ 1,
αS(1− β) + (1− ρ)(β3 − β4 − (αS)2β2(1− β)2 − 2αsβ3(1− β))
+ αS(1− ρ)β(1− β)(β+ αS(1− β)) ≥ 0.
The LHS of this equation is equal to 0 for β = 1. We can check that the derivative of the
LHS with respect to β for β = 1 is strictly negative.
Hence we have cˆS(Only S) ≤ c¯S(Only B) for R and β close enough to 1.
A.3 Proof of Propositions 14 and 15
We prove Proposition 15 and in the process, we also prove Proposition 14.
Self-fulfilling liquidity with cS = ∞ (NI and Only B) and proof that VS(NI) > VS(OnlyB).
We start by proving that when (NI) and (Only B) are possible continuation equilibria for
t ≥ 1, we have cB(NI) < cB(OnlyB). To perform this comparison we note that this will
occur if and only if VS(NI) > VS(Only B). To investigate this inequality, we look at the
corresponding operators TNI and TOnly B:
TNI(VS) = αSρβR2 + αBρβ[1+ βR] + [αSβR + αBβ2]VS.
TOnlyB(VS) = αSρβR2+ αBρβ[1+ βρR]+ ρ(1− ρ)β2R+
[
ρ
(
αSβR + αBβ2
)
+ (1− ρ)β2
]
]VS.
Note that TNI is steeper. The two functions cross at VS = ρβRR−β . We can use the lower
bound VS ≥ ρβ(1+βR)1−β2 , which holds as long as long as the two continuation equilibria
(NI) and (Only B) exist, to check that VS will always be to the right of this crossing point.
Hence, we can rank the two fixed point operators TNI > TOnly B over the relevant region
except when αB = 1, in which case TNI = TOnly B. We conclude that cB(NI) < cB(Only
B) (illiquidity tomorrow leads to illiquidity today) as long as αB < 1 (otherwise the two
thresholds are equal).
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Self-fulfilling liquidity with cB = ∞ (NI and Only S) and proof that VS(NI) > VS(OnlyS).
We now turn to the case cB = ∞. Now we need to check a different condition:
−β2ρ+ β
R
VS(NI)(R− β) > −cS
(
1− β
2
R
)
− β2ρ+ β
R
VS(OnlyS)(R− β)
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for that is that VS(NI) > VS(OnlyS). To inves-
tigate this inequality, we look at the corresponding operators TNI and TOnlyS:
TNI(VS) = αSρβR2 + αBρβ[1+ βR] + [αSβR + αBβ2]VS.
TOnlyS(VS) = ρβ (1+ ρβR)+ (1− ρ)R
[
αBβ2ρ
]
+
[
ρβ2 + (1− ρ)
(
αSβR + αBβ2
)]
(VS− cS).
Note that TNI is steeper. The two functions cross at
VS =
1+ ρβR− R2
R− β +
[
ρβ2 + (1− ρ) (αSβR + αBβ2)]
ρ[αSβR + αBβ2 − β2] (−c
S)
We can use the lower bound VS ≥ ρβ(1+βR)1−β2 , which holds as long as long as the two
continuation equilibria (NI) and (Only S) exist, to check that VS will always be to the
right of the crossing point above. Hence, we can rank the two fixed point operators over
the relevant region.
Self-fulfilling liquidity with cs = 0 (I and Only S) and proof that VS(I) > VS(OnlyS).
We now turn to the case cS = 0. We can check that VS(I) > VS(Only S) if and only
if cS < cS∗, where cS∗ = (R
2−1)[1−(1−ρ)(αBβ+αSR)]
R−β , which is automatically verified if the
continuation equilibrium (Only S) exists. This implies that as long as (I) and (Only S)
exist, we have c¯B(Only S) ≤ c¯B(I).
Self-fulfilling liquidity with cB = 0 (I and Only B). We now turn to the case cB = 0.
We have already established that c¯S(Only B) ≤ cˆS(I) which is equivalent to c¯S(Only
B) ≤ c¯S(I). This implies that as long as the continuation equilibria (I) and (Only B) exist,
we have c¯S(Only B) ≤ c¯S(I).
Proof that VS(NI) > VS(I). The proof is immediate using
TNI(VS) = αSρβR2 + αBρβ[1+ βR] + [αSβR + αBβ2]VS,
and
T I(VS) = αSρβR2 + αBβρ[1+ βR] + [αSβR + αBβ2]
(
VS − cS
)
.
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A.4 Lemma for Section 3
In Section 3, we make use of some comparison of payoffs across equilibria even when
they might not coexist. For example, we establish that vS(I) > vS(Only B) when cS < c¯S
and vS(I) < vS(Only B) when cS > c¯S. As long as cB < cB, the equilibrium is (I) or (Only
B). It is (I) when vS(I) > vS(Only B) and (Only B) when vS(I) < vS(Only B).
Lemma 2. (Further Comparison of Payoffs). The payoffs are ranked as follows:
i. for the seller: vS(NI) ≥ vS(I) ≥ vS(Only S), and vS(NI) ≥ vS(Only B); furthermore
vS(I) ≥ vS(Only B) if and only if cS ≤ c¯S;
ii. for the buyer: vB(NI) ≥ vB(I) ≥ vB(Only B), and vB(NI) ≥ vB(Only S); furthermore
vB(I) ≥ vB(Only S) if and only if cB ≤ c¯B.
iii. for total welfare v = vS + vB: v(NI) ≥ max{v(I), v(Only S), v(Only B)}; furthermore
v(I) ≥ v(Only B) if and only if cS ≤ c¯S
αS
, and v(I) ≥ v(Only S) if and only if cB ≤ c¯B
αB
.
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